This paper defends a deflationary conception of properties, according to which a property exists if and only if there could be a predicate with appropriate satisfaction conditions. I argue that purely general properties and relations necessarily exist and discuss the bearing of this conception of properties on the interpretation of higher-order logic and on Quine's charge that higher-order logic is ‘set theory in sheep's clothing’. On my approach, the usual semantics involves a false assimilation of the logic to set theory. (...) I conclude with remarks about implications for the programme of founding mathematical theories in higher-order logic plus abstraction principles. (shrink)

The acquisition of a new skill usually proceeds through five stages, from novice to expert, with a sixth stage of mastery available for highly motivated performers. In this chapter, we re-state the six stages of the Dreyfus Skill Model, paying new attention to the transitions and interrelations between them. While discussing the fifth stage, expertise, we unpack the claim that, “when things are proceeding normally, experts don’t solve problems and don’t make decisions; they do what normally works” (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, (...) 1988, pp. 30 – 31). This leads us to offer an account of the “perspectival deliberation” that arises for experts and masters and that is distinct from the calculative deliberation characteristic of the lower stages of skillfulness. (shrink)

This article provides a detailed analysis of the transfer of a key cluster of ideas from mathematical logic to computing. We demonstrate the impact of certain of Turing’s logico-philosophical concepts from the mid-1930s on the emergence of the modern electronic computer—and so, in consequence, Turing’s impact on the direction of modern philosophy, via the computational turn. We explain why both Turing and von Neumann saw the problem of developing the electronic computer as a problem in logic, and we describe their (...) joint journey from logic to electronic computation. While much has been written about Turing’s and von Neumann’s individual contributions to the development of the computer, this article investigates less well-known terrain: their interactions and mutual influences. Along the way we argue against ‘logic skeptics’ and ‘Turing skeptics’, who claim that neither logic nor Turing played any significant role in the creation of the modern computer. (shrink)

Early Heidegger argues that a “homogenous space of nature” can be revealed by stripping away the intelligibility of Dasein's everyday world, a process he calls “deworlding.” Given this, some interpreters have suggested that Heidegger, despite not having worked out the details himself, is also committed to a notion of deworlded time. Such a “natural time” would amount to an endogenous sequentiality in which events are ordered independently of Dasein and the stand it takes on its being. I show that Heidegger (...) was indeed committed to such a temporal realism even though his treatment of these issues is somewhat scattered and pulled in different directions. In the course of my reconstruction, I renew an interpretation of Heidegger that stresses Dasein's thrownness into nature and I answer William Blattner's powerful interpretation of Heidegger as a failed temporal idealist who was unable to derive the sequentiality of ordinary time from Dasein's non-sequential originary temporality. Heidegger did not attempt to derive sequentiality; instead, he understood it as a built-in feature of the natural universe by which Dasein's activities are constrained. World-time turns out to be a co-production of Dasein's non-sequential originary temporality and the endogenous sequentiality of events in nature. (shrink)

The operational definition of a weak value for a quantum mechanical system involves the limit of the weak measurement strength tending to zero. I study how this limit compares to the situation for the undisturbed system. Under certain conditions, which I investigate, this limit is discontinuous in the sense that it does not merge smoothly to the Hilbert space description of the undisturbed system. Hence, in these discontinuous cases, the weak value does not represent the undisturbed system. As a result, (...) conclusions drawn from such weak values regarding the properties of the studied system cannot be upheld. Examples are given. (shrink)

We define a property for varieties V, the f.r.p. . If it applies to a finitely based V then V is strongly finitely based in the sense of [14], see Theorem 2. Moreover, we obtain finite axiomatizability results for certain propositional logics associated with V, in its generality comparable to well-known finite base results from equational logic. Theorem 3 states that each variety generated by a 2-element algebra has the f.r.p. Essentially this implies finite axiomatizability of a 2-valued logic in (...) any finite language. (shrink)

We show that in a dilute gas the wave function’s spreading is limited by scattering off other particles. This shows that quantum mechanics can be consistent with the kinetic theory of gases.

The creation of a cloned sheep from mammary tissue has raisedmajor social concern, and much talk about major ethical issuesoccasioned by this technology. It is necessary to separategenuine from spurious ethical issues here, a task made failureto initiate ethical discussion and explanation of new technologyas well as by fear reactions in society. As in geneticengineering of animals, issues about cloning fall into threecategories – suggestions that the technology is inherently wrong,risk emerging from the technology and harm to the creatureengendered. The (...) issues regarding the cloning of humans can beanalyzed using the same categories. (shrink)

There has been a significant increase in the use of radiological services in the past 30 years. There are many reasons for this, but one has received little attention: the increased role of patient autonomy in healthcare. Patients demand x rays, CT scans, MRI, and positron emission tomography scans. The key question in this article is how a moral principle, such as respect for patient autonomy, can influence the extension of radiological services. A literature review reveals how patient autonomy is (...) acknowledged in radiology, and how it is used both to explain and to justify the increase in radiological examinations. Furthermore, it also shows how the premises favouring patients’ exercise of their autonomy are not always present, which makes patient autonomy subject to adverse side effects and even abuse. Patient autonomy can be used to reduce the professionals’ responsibility for radiological examinations , to increase the popularity of the profession , to increase the income of the professionals or their institutions, and to promote professional activity. Patient autonomy intended to reduce paternalism, to legitimise otherwise morally unjustifiable actions , and to protect patients, can easily be used as a moral means for opposite ends. These adverse effects are not peculiar to radiology. However, they emerge particularly clearly in explanations and justifications of the substantial increase in radiological services, as well as in debates on overuse of radiological services. (shrink)

Brian Wormald provides a fundamental reappraisal of one of the most complex and innovative figures of the late-Elizabethan and Jacobean age. In the centuries since his death, Francis Bacon (1561-1626) has been perceived and studied as a promoter and prophet of the philosophy of science--natural science--but he saw himself also as a clarifier and promoter of what he called "policy" or the study and improvement of the structure and function of civil states. Mr. Wormald shows that Bacon was concerned equally (...) with the knowledge of the world of nature and with that of policy. The junction between the two enterprises was effected by his work in history; and in the end it was Bacon's conception and practice of history that provided the answer to his efforts to advance policy and natural philosophy. (shrink)

Public health ethics is a relatively new academic field. Crucially, it is distinguished from traditional medical ethics by its focus on populations rather than individuals. Still, the ethics of public health cannot be perceived completely detached from the ethics of individuals, as populations are made up of individuals. One issue that clearly falls within the intersection of a population- and an individual based perspective on ethics is resource allocation. Resource allocation takes place at various stages within the organisation of healthcare, (...) i.e. at the micro-, meso- and macro level [3]. Resources are almost always limited, with the consequence that some healthcare is prioritised while other care is rationed. In this manner, resource allocation creates winners and losers; those who get the best care available, those who do not receive the best care and those who do not receive care at all. It seems prudent to assume that any adequate public health ethics involved in population-based decision-making will have to address all ethical aspects of resource allocation, all the way from the macrolevel policy-making process to the micro-level implementation where it affects specific and identifiable individuals. More specifically, such an ethics must be able to deal with the ethical tensions arising between population-based concerns framing the policy design process, and individual concerns in the realisation of the resource allocations. In the following, I will identify an inherent ethical tension involved in ‘legitimate resource allocation’, which is related to the challenge of meeting the ethical requirements from a population- and an individual based perspective at the same time. (shrink)

Sex is a fundamentally important biological variable. Recent years have seen significant progress in the integration of sex in many aspects of basic and clinical research, including analyses of sex differences in brain function. Significant advances in the technology available for studying the endocrine and nervous systems are now coupled with a more sophisticated awareness of the interconnections of these two communication systems of the body. A thorough understanding of the current knowledge, conceptual approaches, methodological capabilities, and challenges is a (...) prerequisite to continued progress in research and therapeutics in this interdisciplinary area. Sex Differences in the Brain provides scientists with the basic tools for investigating sex differences in brain and behavior and insight into areas where important progress in understanding physiologically relevant sex differences has already been made. This book was edited and co-authored by members of the Isis Fund Network on Sex, Gender, Drugs and the Brain, sponsored by the Society for Womens Health Research. The book is arranged in three parts. The first part of the book introduces the study of sex differences in the brain, with an overview of how the brain, stress systems, and pharmacogenetics differ in males and females and how this information is important for the study of behavior and neurobiology of both genders. The second part presents examples of sex differences in neurobiology and behavior from both basic and clinical research perspectives, covering both humans and nonhuman animals. The final part discusses sex differences in the neurobiology of disease and neurological disorders. For interested individuals as well as those who are considering conducting research at the intersections of endocrinology, neuroscience, and other areas of biomedicine, the study of sex differences offers exciting and challenging questions and perspectives. This book is intended as a guide and resource for clinicians, scientists, and students. (shrink)

Stanley Cavell has been a brilliant, idiosyncratic, and controversial presence in American philosophy, literary criticism, and cultural studies for years. Even as he continues to produce new writing of a high standard--an example of which is included in this collection--his work has elicited responses from a new generation of writers in Europe and America. This collection showcases this new work, while illustrating the variety of Cavell's interests.

This is a collection of 15 papers from “philosophers, social scientists, and academic lawyers” concerned with “the field of bioethics itself”, “bioethics’s role in contemporary society”, and “specific issues”, including some—such as the role of the pharmaceuticals—not often addressed in such collections. They have all been commissioned for the volume either by or through the Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation, located in the USA, on whose behalf Cambridge University Press has published it in the UK. Perhaps, then, it is not (...) surprising that it …. (shrink)

Attention is drawn to a clear statement of the concept of an absolute zero of temperature by John Locke some time between 1698 and 1704. From the writings of Boyle and Newton it seems unlikely that either of them was responsible for providing their friend with this insight.

The article argues for a strong connection of spiritual and physical care and investigates the question of state- versus church-related social work through the example of a Lutheran women's organization that offers mothers’ recuperation. Through this example, it becomes obvious that too much involvement of the government is as much an obstacle as too little involvement that leaves the question of standards and regulations to the economic competition of social services.

The question of a new journal and the philosophical debate of 1947 In 1922-43 Soviet philosophers had their own journal titled Pod znamenem marksizma [Under the Banner of Marxism]. It came into being in early 1922 and its third issue contained Lenin's programmatic article "On the Significance of Militant Materialism" [O znachenii voinstvuiushchego materializma]. This journal published many good combative articles in its twenty years. But during the War it fell ill and in mid-1943 ceased to exist. It was not (...) discontinued. No, it simply lacked the strength to appear. Thereafter, we Soviet philosophers did not have our own journal for several years. The lack was felt especially keenly after the end of the Great Patriotic War when philosophical studies developed quickly in our country. A wide discussion of philosophical questions, especially contentious, controversial questions—and there were quite a few of them—became necessary but there was no forum for discussing them. This was also true of the critical analysis of the philosophical literature that was coming out: a rare review appeared from time to time in the existing journals, but it was clearly inadequate and, most importantly, it did not give a comprehensive evaluation of the merits and shortcomings of the published philosophical work. It seemed to us then that an unhealthy situation such as the one involving G. F. Aleksandrov's book The History of Western European Philosophy [Istoriia zapadnoevropeiskoi filosofii], which was not evaluated on its merits and, despite its serious flaws, was praised by admirers of the author's talent, could only arise in the absence of a philosophical journal. Had there been a journal, it could have helped to prevent such stuffy situations from arising in certain sections of the philosophical front. Obviously, this opinion was quite naive: at the time many of us did not understand that if Aleksandrov had had "his" man on the journal, no criticism of his book would have been permitted. We realized this later. (shrink)

This paper is a slightly expanded and altered version of comments delivered in response to a paper by Andrew Dilts at the 35th Annual Spindel Conference in Memphis, TN. I focus on the elision of the state in Dilts' paper in order to demonstrate the need for a genealogy that takes seriously the role of sovereignty in constructing the present of trans femmes and trans women of color.

Instead, this book employs a philosophy oriented towards the relationship between self and other. The book gives a critical discussion of religion, the Enlightenment and Romanticism.

Collapse is a term that has attracted much attention in social science literature in recent years, but there remain substantial areas of disagreement about how it should be understood in historical contexts. More specifically, the use of the term collapse often merely serves to dramatize long-past events, to push human actors into the background, and to mystify the past intellectually. At the same time, since human societies are complex systems, the alternative involves grasping the challenges that a holistic analysis presents, (...) taking account of the many different levels and paces at which societies function, and developing appropriate methods that help to integrate science and history. Often neglected elements in considerations of collapse are the perceptions and beliefs of a historical society and how a given society deals with change; an important facet of this, almost entirely ignored in the discussion, is the understanding of time held by the individuals and social groups affected by change; and from this perspective ‘collapse’ depends very much on perception, including the perceptions of the modern commentator. With this in mind, this article challenges simplistic notions of ‘collapse’ in an effort to encourage a more nuanced understanding of the impact and process of both social and environmental change on past human societies. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X.

The paper illustrates how organic chemists dramatically altered their practices in the middle part of the twentieth century through the adoption of analytical instrumentation - such as ultraviolet and infrared absorption spectroscopy and nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy - through which the difficult process of structure determination for small molecules became routine. Changes in practice were manifested in two ways: in the use of these instruments in the development of 'rule-based' theories; and in an increased focus on synthesis, at the expense (...) of chemical analysis. These rule-based theories took the form of generalizations relating structure to chemical and physical properties, as measured by instrumentation. This 'Instrumental Revolution' in organic chemistry was two-fold: encompassing an embrace of new tools that provided unprecedented access to structures, and a new way of thinking about molecules and their reactivity in terms of shape and structure. These practices suggest the possibility of a change in the ontological status of chemical structures, brought about by the regular use of instruments. The career of Robert Burns Woodward (1917-1979) provides the central historical examples for the paper. Woodward was an organic chemist at Harvard from 1937 until the time of his death. In 1965, he won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry. (shrink)

In his account of probable reasoning, Poincaré used the concept, or at least the language, of conventions. In particular, he claimed that the prior probabilities essential for inverse probable reasoning are determined conventionally. This paper investigates, in the light of Poincaré's well known claim about the conventionality of metric geometry, what this could mean, and how it is related to other views about the determination of prior probabilities. Particular attention is paid to the similarities and differences between Poincaré's conventionalism as (...) it applies to probabilities and de Finetti's subjectivism. The aim of the paper is to suggest that in accounts of the development of ideas about probable reasoning, particularly those customarily described as Bayesian, Poincaré's discussion deserves more attention than it has so far received. (shrink)

This is a lively and spirited discussion—perhaps more appropriately called one side of a debate—by Feyerabend against traditional views in the philosophy of science associated with such persons as Carnap, Hempel, and Popper. The central issue is whether or not there exists a neutral method for the construction of scientific systems and whether, more specifically, there is within that method some uniform, rational evaluation measure for arbitrating between competing theoretical models. Traditional positions, whether they be of a verificationist, conformationist, or (...) falsificationist sort, presuppose that there is some rational method for analyzing and evaluating scientific theories. Feyerabend maintains most emphatically that there is not. He rejects the distinctions between contexts of discovery and contexts of justification, between experience and theory, and between observation terms and theoretical terms. In the clash between traditional philosophies of science and the more historical and sociological approaches associated with the names of Kuhn and Hanson, the author sides with the latter. He goes even farther, however, and maintains what he calls an "anarchistic theory of knowledge" in which "anything goes." Within his approach it is not canons of rationality and logic which have dominated or ought to dominate scientific discussions. Rather, a proponent of a new theory utilizes persuasion and cunning rather than appealing to or using objective conditions for guiding choices between competing theories. New paradigms within science do not triumph because they are more rational; they depend on utterly new criteria of rationality. (shrink)

At once a distinguished mathematician and an important figure in the Vienna Circle, Hans Hahn conducted a seminar in 1924-25 on the Principia Mathematica to "a very large audience" of mathematicians and philosophers. Translated from the German and edited by Brian McGuinness, with a biographical introduction by Karl Menger, the present volume consists largely of papers in the philosophy of mathematics covering the years 1929-34. "Our adoption of Russell’s position," writes Hahn, "may cause some surprise in Germany where all ears (...) are tuned, to the controversy between... Hilbert and Brouwer." It turns out, however, that Wittgenstein has made the decisive move: mathematics consists of tautologies, Russell having "shown" how to get by without sets. (shrink)

Semantics of Detachment A Review of Burkhard Hasebrink, Susanne Bernhardt, and Imke Früh, eds., Semantik der Gelassenheit: Generierung, Etablierung, Transformation [Semantics of detachment: Formation, establishment, transformation] Silke Schwandt Beyond the Untranslatability of Concepts A Review of Martin J. Burke and Melvin Richter, eds., Why Concepts Matter: Translating Social and Political Thought László Kontler Emotional Modernities A Review of Ute Frevert, Monique Scheer, Anne Schmidt, Pascal Eitler, Bettina Hitzer, Nina Verheyen, Benno Gammerl, Christian Bailey, and Margrit Pernau, Gefühlswissen: Eine lexikalische Spurensuche (...) in der Moderne [Emotional knowledge: In search of lexical clues in modernity] Anu Korhonen Beyond Peace as a Process A Review of Julia Harfensteller, The United Nations and Peace: The Evolution of an Organizational Concept Marie-Christine Boilard Human Rights as Conceptual History A Review of Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, ed., Human Rights in the Twentieth Century Johan Strang. (shrink)

Semantics of Detachment A Review of Burkhard Hasebrink, Susanne Bernhardt, and Imke Früh, eds., Semantik der Gelassenheit: Generierung, Etablierung, Transformation [Semantics of detachment: Formation, establishment, transformation] Silke Schwandt Beyond the Untranslatability of Concepts A Review of Martin J. Burke and Melvin Richter, eds., Why Concepts Matter: Translating Social and Political Thought László Kontler Emotional Modernities A Review of Ute Frevert, Monique Scheer, Anne Schmidt, Pascal Eitler, Bettina Hitzer, Nina Verheyen, Benno Gammerl, Christian Bailey, and Margrit Pernau, Gefühlswissen: Eine lexikalische Spurensuche (...) in der Moderne [Emotional knowledge: In search of lexical clues in modernity] Anu Korhonen Beyond Peace as a Process A Review of Julia Harfensteller, The United Nations and Peace: The Evolution of an Organizational Concept Marie-Christine Boilard Human Rights as Conceptual History A Review of Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, ed., Human Rights in the Twentieth Century Johan Strang. (shrink)

There is a central issue which runs through most of the details of Walker’s interpretation—the relationship between what he calls, taking his cue from Strawson, "transcendental idealism" and "transcendental arguments." He argues often and, I think, correctly, that the contemporary attempt to reconstruct Kant "austerely" in terms of transcendental arguments alone is misguided, that transcendental arguments about "what must be the case in order for there to be experience at all" cannot accomplish their task, and that we should rest content (...) with the more modest goal of discussing those aspects of our nonempirical "thoughts" or "beliefs" about the world which seem indispensably involved in our experience. Of course, we would still need something like a "transcendental argument" to establish these subjective conditions, but Walker uses that term to refer exclusively to Strawson’s austere reconstruction, and to argue that only Kant’s idealistic use of such arguments comes close to philosophic success. (shrink)

This work is a departure from traditional investigations of induction. Rather than consider issues related to the justification or construction of a scientific inductive logic, Professor Will exposes, evaluates, and rejects the epistemological framework within which work in the philosophy of induction is usually conducted. He argues that the frustrating difficulties faced in the philosophy of induction are endemic to that theory of knowledge which "resulted from the empiricist criticism and revision of the basic Cartesian view that knowledge is a (...) kind of vision or intuition, that there are certain first intuitions, and that further knowledge consists of consequent intuitions elicited from or founded upon these." According to this view of knowledge, a knowledge claim can be justified in the face of the challenge of philosophical skepticism only if it is either itself indubitable or rests on some foundation that is indubitable. The burden of Will’s work is to show that this foundation or "justification" picture of knowledge is seriously mistaken and must be replaced with a more adequate and more realistic view. Human knowledge, he stresses, is best seen as analogous to a constitution. As human knowledge differs from area to area these constitutions differ, "just as history differs from horticulture and architecture from aviation." However, "collectively they form a huge sprawling entity that represents what may be thought of as the constitution for the institutionalized activity of human knowledge.". (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Logic and epistemology The eternity of the world Human happiness.

In his account of probable reasoning, Poincare used the concept, or at least the language, of conventions. In particular, he claimed that the prior probabilities essential for inverse probable reasoning are determined conventionally. This paper investigates, in the light of Poincare's well known claim about the conventionality of metric geometry, what this could mean, and how it is related to other views about the determination of prior probabilities. Particular attention is paid to the similarities and differences between Poincare's conventionalism as (...) it applies to probabilities and de Finetti's subjectivism. The aim of the paper is to suggest that in accounts of the development of ideas about probable reasoning, particularly those customarily described as Bayesian, Poincare's discussion deserves more attention than it has so far received. (shrink)